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Water Quality Trading in the Chesapeake Bay
Executive Summary
Proponents of water quality trading describe it as a silver bullet solution to the severe
nutrient pollution that plagues the Chesapeake Bay. At least in theory, trading has two
advantages. First, it would allow regulated sources, such as publicly owned treatment works
(POTWs), municipal storm sewers, and concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs),
to spread the considerable costs of cleaning up the Bay’s waters among themselves. Second,
it would permit those regulated sources to pay unregulated agricultural operations to
reduce their nonpoint pollution at a lower cost. Planting buffer crops, prohibiting the
application of manure to cropland in the winter, and similar best management practices
(BMPs) are less expensive than retrofitting POTWs with pollution control equipment.
Because the agricultural sector generates roughly 44 percent of the nitrogen
and phosphorus that enters the Bay,1 controlling discharges from agriculture
is a critical component of any rigorous Bay restoration strategy.
For trading proponents, the timing could not be better. In 2010, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) established the Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load
(TMDL) for nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment. The Bay TMDL is comprised of separate
numerical limits for 92 impaired water segments throughout the Bay Watershed. A water
body is impaired if it is sufficiently polluted that it cannot support its “designated use—e.g.,
drinking, swimming, or boating.” Often referred to as a “pollution diet,” the Bay TMDL
imposes strict limits on the quantities of nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment and allocates
the total permissible amount of each pollutant among the Bay states and the District of
Columbia. The Bay states and the District must then make sure that the cumulative total of
discharges from all sources does not exceed the limits set by the Bay TMDL, rewriting the
permits of regulated sources to reduce their discharges and otherwise creating incentives
for unregulated agricultural sources to cut back on their pollution. In response to these
tough limits, most Bay states have already begun to plan or implement trading regimes
between point and nonpoint sources, and these programs are very likely to expand in the
near-term.2
EPA and the Bay states face a daunting task, and we understand why they are exploring
every possible avenue to success. They confront the TMDL challenge at the same time
that severe budget shortfalls undermine their effectiveness. But the federal and Bay
state partners cannot afford to adopt a series of solutions that sound good on
paper but do not deliver results. Failing again to improve the Bay would destroy their
credibility, already undermined because they have a history of taking the easy way out—
churning out paper plans but making scant progress on the ground—in past restoration
efforts that have fallen far short of expectations over the last three decades.
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The purpose of this paper is to identify critical elements of an effective trading program.
Even if a substantial number of trades are made, the silver bullet will miss its target by a wide
margin unless trading programs satisfy these minimal requirements. An equally likely and
unfortunate scenario is that agricultural operators will decline the invitation to participate
in trading programs, preferring to go about business as usual without sanctioning what
they perceive to be quasi-regulation. Under either scenario, implementing unworkable and
ineffective trading regimes will only serve to distract policymakers from making the hard
choices necessary to ensure real and lasting gains. Trading is a means, not an end.
If it fails, it should go. Bay states should be prepared with contingency plans should
trading markets fail to perform as expected, including plans to implement mandatory
programs for agricultural reductions to achieve the Bay TMDL if pollution reductions fall
behind schedule.
An industry lawsuit challenging the Bay TMDL is pending as this paper is written, and
a legal challenge to trading by an environmental group is possible. We do not address
the merits of either lawsuit here. Instead, this paper assumes that the Bay states and
the District of Columbia will proceed, full speed ahead, with the design and attempted
implementation of trading and offsetting regimes.
The Bay states are not the first to deploy a water quality trading regime and would benefit
from a careful study of the lessons from other states that have experimented with such
initiatives. Especially when trading involves unregulated nonpoint sources, state and local
officials have expended substantial resources only to discover that unregulated agricultural
sources refuse to participate.3 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) economists
point out, for example, that of 15 trading programs that promote trades
between point sources and agricultural nonpoint sources, only four have
experienced any trades and just two have experienced more than a handful.4
These experiences underscore the danger that Bay states will become unduly preoccupied
with the implementation of trading regimes that fail for lack of agricultural participants,
causing them to miss their milestones for reducing pollution and fall far behind in meeting
the Bay TMDL’s long-term goals.
Our recommendations are grouped into two categories: (1) measures necessary to ensure
that trading does not undermine public health and environmental quality and (2) program
elements that ensure the integrity and effectiveness of trading so that such regimes do not
foster fraud or fail to deliver expected environmental benefits.
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Recommendations
Protecting Public Health and the Environment
As the experience of other states demonstrates, a successful trading regime depends
on robust demand for credits. Only strong regulations can stimulate such demand.
Therefore, federal and state regulators must remain committed to achieving
nutrient reductions by using traditional regulatory controls. A trading program
cannot succeed if it is implemented in the absence of regulatory standards.
Although Congress seems currently incapable of updating major environmental laws, we
must nevertheless emphasize the importance of extending the Clean Water Act (CWA)
to cover nonpoint sources. The best hope for successful trading is to give all of
the sources that contribute to the Bay’s pollution crisis equal incentive to
participate in distributing the costs of reductions more efficiently.
Government regulators must prevent the formation of “hot spots,” or localized
concentrations of nutrients, that threaten public health or the environment in particular
areas. Regulators should implement geographic restrictions on downstream, interbasin,
and interstate trades unless the segment into which the buyer discharges meets water quality
standards. They should also require credit buyers to cease discharges if the discharges for
which credits are purchased lead to the formation of hot spots. Finally, regulators must
consider environmental justice concerns and vulnerable communities that may be affected
by new or increased pollutant discharges.
To compensate for the uncertainties caused by unreliable technologies for measuring the
results of BMPs designed to reduce pollution, trading regimes must incorporate measures
to prevent excessive pollutant loads, such as requiring at least two units of nonpoint source
reductions for every one unit of point source reduction credited.
Monitoring and Oversight to Avoid Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
Bay states already lack the resources they need for traditional enforcement. Creating a
viable trading market poses different challenges, but it will be no less demanding in terms
of resources. Indeed, accountability for trading could easily be shortchanged without
additional funding and staffing. EPA should exercise its oversight authority under the
CWA to ensure that trading programs help Bay states to achieve water quality standards
and the Bay TMDL. A trading program must be monitored and must achieve its targets.
EPA should ensure that Bay states’ trading programs meet at a minimum the guidelines
established in its Water Quality Trading Policy (2003), previous letters to Bay states, and
most importantly Appendix S of the Bay TMDL.5
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Appendix S of the Bay TMDL:
EPA Requirements that Must Be Met and Implemented
EPA directly addresses the use of offsets for new and expanded discharges in Section 10
and Appendix S of the Bay TMDL. EPA expects Bay states to completely offset new and
expanded discharges that are not specifically accounted for in the Bay TMDL. Appendix S
contains a list of “common elements” that EPA “encourages and expects” Bay states to use for
offset and trading programs. Unfortunately, throughout its discussion of trading and offset
programs, EPA explicitly states that Appendix S and the recommendations in Section 10 are
not mandatory regulatory requirements. Because the agency itself recognizes “the value
that consistent offset programs will have in promoting effective regional implementation of
the [Bay] TMDL,” EPA should mandate that at a minimum Bay states adopt these common
elements before their trading programs go forward.
Among the most important elements:
■■ States must require that point sources first meet their “technology-based
effluent limits” (TBEL) prior to using credits for trading or offsets. Point
sources should only be permitted to purchase credits to achieve the more
stringent “water quality based effluent limits” (WQBEL) needed to restore
water quality. The CWA mandates that point sources use a sector-wide standard of
TBELs limits. If those TBELs are insufficient to meet water quality standards, a secondary
set of water quality-based effluent limits goes into effect, along with the requirement to
establish a TMDL. In the Bay, states must ensure that all point sources meet their TBEL and
have installed the required technology prior to purchasing any credits. Trading cannot be
used to meet TBELs.
■■ States must ensure that permit writers incorporate trading transactions into
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits held
by point sources seeking to buy or sell credits. WQBELs based on WLAs should
also be incorporated into permits. This element is important because the terms
and conditions in NPDES permits are enforceable by EPA and states, as well as by citizens
through the CWA’s citizen suit provision.
■■ States must ensure that nonpoint sources meet a minimum baseline, such as a
suite of BMPs, before they are permitted to generate and sell credits. Baselines
should be carefully calibrated to meet the TMDL sector load allocation and be strict
enough that the total reductions will be significant but leave sufficient room to allow for
trading to be profitable.
■■ States must protect vulnerable communities from disproportionate impacts
arising from trading. This is EPA’s most explicit support for considering environmental
justice in trading. States should ensure that disproportionate impacts are considered and
avoided.
EPA should also strengthen its guidance as part of its oversight authority under the CWA. For
example, the agency should consider retracting its support for interstate trading in Section
10 of the Bay TMDL. Proposed interstate and interbasin trading raises concerns about the
consistency of state programs and the likelihood of these trades to rely on the least stringent
requirements. EPA should also strictly adhere to section 122.4 of the CWA regulations and
enforce restrictions on trading in impaired waters.
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Recommendations (continued)
The Bay TMDL creates an enforceable limit on total discharges, but it could be undermined
by fraud and the uncertain performance of certain agricultural BMPs used to achieve
pollutant reductions. These reductions must be real, not simply phantom savings
generated by dubious accounting methods. To ensure accountability, federal regulators
should mandate that:
(1) Bay states adopt numeric nutrient criteria for nitrogen and phosphorus as
objective, quantitative, and measurable markers of success or failure to achieve
pollution reductions;
(2) Bay states conduct comprehensive, in-stream water quality monitoring to ensure that
actual reductions occur as a result of trading programs;
(3) Trading program participants submit periodic, standardized reports on their
discharges, trades, pollution-reducing, and credit-generating activities to ensure that
trading programs generate the promised pollution reductions; and
(4) All trades and periodic reports are made available online.
EPA and Bay states should ensure that trades are enforceable by either incorporating trade
terms into the NPDES permit of a regulated point source or memorializing the trade terms
in a contract that allows EPA or the state to enforce the contract as a third-party beneficiary.
Ultimately, a trading program cannot be implemented on a shoestring budget. EPA and Bay
states should plan for the necessary financial, technical, and personnel resources needed to
monitor and oversee trading programs for the long-term.
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Introduction
Restoration of the Chesapeake Bay has reached a turning point. EPA’s development of
the Bay TMDL is the most promising forward progress in the past few decades, and states
and local governments have done much work to develop implementation plans to meet the
pollution diet. Faced with the pressure to address pollution from nonpoint sources, water
quality trading has emerged as a favored option for some policymakers and Bay advocates
because it creates a financial incentive for those sources to voluntarily reduce pollution. If
participation is widespread, significant reductions in nutrients are possible.
An environmentally sound water quality trading program is more complicated in practice
than it is on paper, though. For example, the technical and financial resources to measure
and monitor nonpoint source pollution reductions still fall short, rendering uncertain the
actual amount of reductions claimed as part of a trade. Poor and inadequate enforcement
against point sources can lead to weak demand and a failure to improve water quality.
And, if regulators fail to prevent fraudulent transactions or allow overly permissive credit
banking, the Bay TMDL’s firm limit on pollution could easily become undermined and
meaningless. Bay states that promote trading can avoid some of these harder challenges
by instituting less stringent rules, but they risk the possibility that uncontrolled or underregulated trading will not improve water quality in the Bay, or even contribute to further
degradation.
The primary goal of a trading program should be to meet water quality
standards and to improve overall water quality. We therefore examine trading
from the perspective of accountability, asking what is necessary to make such a program
actually achieve its water quality objectives. After providing a brief overview of water
quality trading programs, we make basic recommendations to continue using traditional
regulatory tools, to establish a set of minimum criteria, and to ensure resources for the
long term. We then detail the basis for an accountability framework, built on the pillars
of monitoring and verification, protecting human health and the environment, and
enforcement and oversight.

Proceed with Caution: The Mismatch between Trading
on Paper and in Practice
Trading Programs: How the Markets Work on Paper
Environmental markets align a community of buyers that are legally obligated to meet a
certain environmental standard with sellers that can meet this standard at a significantly
lower cost. With the Bay TMDL, the potential buyers include the regulated point sources
that face requirements to further reduce pollution discharges and fully offset new or
expanded discharges. The potential sellers are some point sources but mostly nonpoint
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sources—largely unregulated agricultural operations—that face few, if any, mandatory
requirements to reduce their discharges. By reducing their runoff, the sellers generate
credits that the buyers purchase, resulting in a “win-win” solution: the regulated point
sources achieve their pollution reductions, the nonpoint sources have an incentive to
reduce their pollution, and the cumulative reductions help states to achieve the Bay TMDL.

The Market Driver
The World Resources Institute (WRI) estimates that a municipality required to reduce
nutrient-rich stormwater effluent would face a cost of over $200 per pound of
annual nitrogen reduction. With nutrient trading, the municipality could pay an
agricultural operator to plant winter cover crops instead, at a cost of just $4.70 per
pound of annual nitrogen reduction. On paper, this exchange sounds ideal: The
agricultural operator earns a premium for behavior society would like to encourage
in the first place, the regulated polluter achieves compliance with its permit, and
nutrient levels in the waterway are reduced dramatically. However, in practice,
water quality trading has not yet been the success that proponents have imagined.

See Cy Jones, et al., World Resources Institute, How Nutrient Trading Could Help
Restore the Chesapeake Bay (2010), available at http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/
how_nutrient_trading_could_help_restore_the_chesapeake_bay.pdf

Trading Programs: How the Markets Fail in Practice
The lack of sufficient supply and demand, the two most basic and necessary
components of a market, is the major reason that water quality trading
programs have not succeeded in reducing nutrient pollution. A strong regulatory
driver and the threat of enforcement generate demand for credits, and the lack thereof can
doom trading programs. Because regulated sources must meet an enforceable pollution
limit, trading becomes a cost-effective tool for them to meet their legal obligations or a
profitable way to sell credits for pollution reductions below their limits. At the same time,
point sources may have concerns about equity when they see nonpoint sources profiting
from trading while point sources alone must bear the burden of regulation.
On the supply side, nonpoint sources lack strong legal obligations to control their pollution
and thus lack a crucial driver to participate in the marketplace. The financial incentive to
generate and sell credits must therefore overcome obstacles to initial participation and
account for other concerns. For example, trading programs often require sellers to first
meet baseline pollutant reductions and to generate an additional reserve of credits to
account for the inherent uncertainty in quantifying pollution reductions from agricultural
lands. Ultimately, some nonpoint sources may decide that the profit potential is insufficient
to justify participating in the market.
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Agricultural nonpoint sources may also be reluctant to participate in a system that requires
them to explicitly acknowledge their contribution to pollution or to accept additional
oversight of their businesses. They may be concerned that their voluntary participation
now may lead to “a credible basis for justifying future restrictions on their emissions that
could result in significant long-term costs later.”6
At a more fundamental level, the value and quality of credits are difficult to measure
and guarantee. This lack of certainty can open the door to fraudulent, overstated, and
underperforming trades and undermine progress toward improving water quality. To
avoid paper trades or minimally functional trades, oversight is absolutely necessary to
enforce regulatory requirements, prevent gaming of the system, and otherwise protect the
public interest that is often ignored in environmental markets. Absent this oversight, the
prospects for water quality credit markets to prevent declining water quality are dim.

Aligning Trading Programs on Paper and in Practice:
Overarching Recommendations
The simple truth is that water quality trading has not met expectations in other parts of
the country. Although EPA has supported more than 50 water quality trading programs
nationwide, few of these programs genuinely function because of design and implementation
problems.7 For example, USDA economists have found that, of 15 trading programs that
promote trades between point sources and agricultural nonpoint sources, only four have
experienced any trades, and just two have experienced more than a handful.8 Given
this track record, policymakers should proceed with caution before scarce government
resources are poured into programs that do not deliver the reductions required by the Bay
TMDL. At the most basic level:
■■ Federal and state regulators must remain committed to achieving

nutrient reductions by using traditional regulatory controls in addition
to trading programs and outlining contingency plans to reduce pollution
if trading does not produce the expected reductions. The cost savings
promised by trading advocates are important but alone cannot justify the adoption of
trading in lieu of traditional pollution controls and infrastructure improvements. A
strong regulatory driver and the threat of enforcement bring buyers and sellers to the
table and are critical to any successful, robust environmental trading program.
EPA should also require Bay states to develop contingency plans that specifically
address how nutrients will be reduced if trading does not work or does not produce
as many reductions as expected. For example, a contingency plan could limit trades
from nonpoint sources or increase trading ratios. The Bay states could also implement
mandatory regulations for agriculture if trading programs fail, as Delaware, Maryland,
and Virginia have stated in their Watershed Implementation Plans.
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■■ EPA should ensure that trading programs in the Bay meet the minimum

guidelines established in its Water Quality Trading Policy (2003),
previous letters to Bay states, and most importantly Section 10 and
Appendix S of the Bay TMDL.9 While EPA’s guidance is not a regulatory
document and instead provides basic, broad outlines for how Bay states should think
about trading, it nevertheless provides some recommendations that should serve
as minimum requirements for trading in the Bay. Appendix S of the Bay TMDL
establishes a stronger set of “common elements” that EPA expects to see with respect
to offsetting new or increased nitrogen, phosphorus and sediment loadings. EPA
should evaluate whether proposed programs meet these elements both on paper and
in practice.
■■ EPA and the Bay states should ensure resources for the long term.

The Bay states are frighteningly low on resources for traditional enforcement of
environmental laws. Trading will require substantial additional funding and staffing
in order to adequately monitor the market, but those resources do not exist. For
example, the Maryland Department of the Environment has concluded in every year
since 2007 that the agency is significantly underfunded to fulfill its basic mission.10
Between 2000 and 2009, overall funding for the enforcement workforce of the Water
Management Administration (WMA) declined nearly 25 percent when adjusted for
inflation and coincided with a doubling of pollutant-discharge permits in effect.
During the same period, the number of active, full-time inspectors in the WMA also
decreased by 25 percent. The funding picture for other states is hardly any better.11
EPA and the Bay states should plan for and ensure the long-term availability of
resources for enforcement and oversight of trading.
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Lessons from Another Media:
Trading in the Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain Program
The Acid Rain Program is often cited as an unmitigated success that provides the
paradigm for expanding trading programs to other pollutants and media. Yet the
reasons why sulfur dioxide trading achieved its goals are too often overlooked. They
include:
■■ The acid rain trading program was established in the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments, which made critical threshold decisions such as
the initial allocation of pollution credits, leaving EPA free to focus
on eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse from the system. Clear and
unquestionable threshold rules simplify program implementation by reducing
legal and technical uncertainty and articulating the costs of inaction or
noncompliance.
■■ The program was premised on continuous emissions monitoring
for each and every coal-fired power plant that participated in the
program, thereby assuring that trading was based on accurate
estimates of future emissions. The Acid Rain Program benefitted from
some of the most rigorous and complete emissions data ever collected by a
government agency. Regulators built on a pre-existing and well-developed
regulatory regime under the Clean Air Act that enabled extensive monitoring,
reporting, and verification, as well as rigorous data quality analysis. Because all
sources had installed continuous emissions monitoring, baseline data went back
several years.
■■ Hard caps on total emissions and strong enforcement create robust
demand for credits and encourage innovative pollution reduction
techniques. Strong caps, clear consequences, and increasingly punitive
penalties create incentives strong enough to drive robust demand. In the Acid
Rain Program, excess emissions automatically triggered significant economic
penalties in addition to being deducted from a facility’s allowances. Regulators
also set a sufficiently low cap to ensure demand would be strong.
■■ High concentrations of SO2 that resulted from episodic trades did
not pose a threat to public health and the environment. The hot spot
problem—that is, accumulation of dangerous levels of pollution as a direct result
of trading—was not a problem in the acid rain trading program because SO2
had attenuated, not acute, local effects.
Unfortunately, none of these conditions apply to water quality trading in the
Chesapeake Bay at the moment. Monitoring technology is primitive at best, hot
spots are a real threat, and the uncertainty inherent in BMP implementation could
undermine the cap established by the Bay TMDL.
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Principles for Accountability in Trading:
Comprehensive Design, Environmental Equity,
and Rigorous Enforcement
Water quality trading markets that lack real accountability are unlikely to succeed in
achieving the Bay TMDL or making any real progress towards water quality improvements.
Policymakers can look to three overarching principles to support truly accountable trading
programs in the Chesapeake. First, EPA and the Bay states can ensure that the Bay TMDL
drives real pollution reductions by focusing on robust design elements like monitoring,
verification, and the use of trading ratios. Second, the Bay states and EPA must focus on
avoiding hot spots and promoting environmental equity. Finally, the Bay states and EPA
must commit to effective oversight and enforcement.

Principle I: A rigorous, accountable trading program ensures the Bay
TMDL drives real pollution reductions through robust monitoring and
verification.
In the rush to establish trading programs, EPA and the Bay states have so far failed to
adopt mechanisms to quantify, monitor, verify, and track nutrient reductions and trades.
Without these key mechanisms, neither federal or state officials nor the public will be
able to determine whether trading results in nutrient reductions. Trading programs may
become vulnerable to fraud that could undermine the Bay TMDL. For example, without
verifying whether certain practices are actually implemented and reduce nutrient runoff
or without gathering in-stream monitoring data, trading programs may produce a flurry of
activity on paper but ultimately fail to help states achieve the Bay TMDL.
The following recommendations help to ensure that trading programs do not undermine
the firm cap set by the Bay TMDL and are credible, fair, and ultimately lead to real
improvements in water quality.
Bay states should adopt numeric nutrient criteria specifically for nitrogen
and phosphorous as clear markers of success or failure to reduce pollution
and therefore objective measures of accountability.
Under the CWA, states are required to establish broad water quality standards that consist
of two main components: a designated use and water quality criteria.12 The designated
use identifies for what purposes the water body will be used, such as drinking water,
recreational, or industrial use. Water quality criteria establish the chemical, biological,
nutrient, and sediment composition of a water body and requires their levels to support the
designated use. Water quality criteria can be numeric for toxic pollutants such as arsenic
or narrative for other pollutants, including nutrients.13 However, in 1998 EPA established
a policy to strongly encourage all states to develop numeric nutrient criteria.14
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A narrative water quality standard is not a black-and-white test but instead an
extremely subjective evaluation. Among the Bay states, only New York and Virginia
have adopted numeric nutrient criteria and only for a few water bodies. The remaining
Bay states rely on narrative criteria.15 Although the numeric allocations in the Bay TMDL
are a significant first step, numeric nutrient criteria further promote accountability
by establishing a clear threshold of the concentration of nutrients in the Bay that is
measurable. The Bay TMDL is indisputably an important tool for reducing pollution, but
it is only a measure of how much pollution is entering the Bay. A numeric measurement of
the concentrations of pollutants actually in the water is more accurate.
The table below demonstrates the objective nature of numeric criteria compared to the
subjective nature of narrative criteria.
NUMERIC16

NARRATIVE
“The waters of [Maryland] may not be
polluted by any material… attributable to
sewage, industrial waste, or other wastes in
amounts sufficient to be unsightly, produce
taste or color, [or] change the color to
produce objectionable color for aesthetic
purposes.”17

“For the protection of human health against
the ingestion of contaminated water and
contaminated aquatic organisms: The
ambient water quality criterion for cadmium is
recommended to be identical to the existing
drinking water standard, which is 10 µg/L
(micrograms per liter).”

Bay states should require comprehensive, in-stream water quality
monitoring to ensure that actual reductions occur as a result of trading
programs.
A trading program that succeeds in meeting water quality standards begins
with high quality and accurate real-time data, which in turn requires
substantial monitoring and measurement efforts. Monitoring is required because
it indicates that pollution is (or is not) actually being reduced, apart from what models
may project. For example, the oft-cited successful acid rain trading program depended
in large measure on the ubiquitous use of “continuous emissions monitoring” that was
extraordinarily reliable in quantifying emissions. No comparable mechanism exists for
gauging the reductions achieved by the BMPs used to reduce nutrient loading, especially
from nonpoint sources.
An expansive monitoring network enables effective oversight by regulatory agencies,
allowing regulators to identify all sources of nutrients to the Bay and quickly locate and
address hot spots. Accomplishing those goals helps promote accountability by expanding
the universe of information and improving the efficacy of the marketplace. A strong
monitoring program should comprehensively gather data, track nutrients, and identify
sources of pollution to the Bay. Measuring discharges from point sources and relying on
ratios or models for nonpoint source discharges will not be sufficient to ensure that trading
programs are accountable.
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EPA and Bay states should require independent, rigorous, and transparent
verification of nutrient reductions.
EPA, Bay states, and even universities or other organizations should develop
reliable scientific and technical tools to verify that actual reductions are
occurring in practice and to better assess the effectiveness of pollution
reduction actions. Trading programs that can effectively verify nutrient reductions and
compliance with trade agreements are accountable because they can show actual pollution
reductions are occurring. The USDA’s Nitrogen Trading Tool is an example of one model,
but it is in the prototype stage.18
Verification should be conducted by individuals or organizations with no conflicts of
interest. In Pennsylvania, for example, verification is being conducted by entities that
may have conflicts of interest—agricultural consultants with pre-existing relationships
with agricultural concerns, for example. Fraud will remain a very urgent concern in water
quality trading, highlighting the need for both comprehensive water quality monitoring
and accurate and independent verification.

The Problem with Verifying Implementation: An Example
One of the major obstacles to trading is quantifying pollution reductions from credit
sellers such as agricultural operators and other nonpoint sources. Because the very
nature of pollution from these sources is diffuse, the inability to quantify pollution
reductions and therefore verify that the reductions have occurred threaten to
undermine the quality of trading credits. The risk of giving excess credit or trading
paper credits for unquantified and unverified activities increases, and the Bay would
continue to suffer.
EPA, the USDA, and Bay states all provide cost share funding for certain BMPs that are
intended to reduce nutrient and sediment runoff from agricultural lands. However,
spot-checks for implementation are low. For example, in Virginia only 5 percent
of each type of BMP is inspected. Such a low rate is inadequate to verify pollutant
reductions, both for trading purposes and for achieving the Bay TMDL

EPA and Bay states should require trading program participants to submit
periodic, standardized reports on their discharges, trades, pollutionreducing, and credit-generating activities to ensure that trading programs
generate the promised pollutant reductions.
Self-reporting by the regulated community is at the core of many environmental statutes
and is essential to accountability in trading. It places part of the onus of regulation on the
polluters themselves and maximizes public resources for regulators to conduct inspections
and enforcement actions. Reporting also increases the information available to regulators
and the public to prioritize and improve oversight and enforcement.

C

E

N

T

E

R

F

O

R

P

R

O

G
13

R

E

S

S

I

V

E

R

E

F

O

R

M

ACCOUNTABILITY
Water Quality Trading in the Chesapeake Bay

All sources in the Bay should be required to submit annual and quarterly selfreports on discharges, soil and nutrient management practices, and abatement
efforts using tools like the discharge monitoring reports already required of
permitted point sources. Each report should detail the terms of the trade, including
the nature of the discharges being offset, baseline verification, and financial assurances.
If Bay states use aggregators or exchanges to facilitate trades, credit generators should be
required to submit details of their credit generating activities, including verification plans,
in their proposals. EPA and Bay states should make these reports available to the public.
Bay states should establish transparent markets by making trading data
public.
EPA and Bay states should ensure that trading markets are transparent by publicly
disclosing trading data and information. Transparency allows for better public oversight,
fosters trust in the markets themselves, and enables faster resolution of environmental and
equity problems. For example, to determine whether the sellers of credits are implementing
promised pollutant reductions, EPA and Bay states must be able to monitor compliance
with trade agreements and permit conditions. Only by measuring water quality can
regulators tell whether pollutant limits are being met. Data should be widely and publicly
shared, including periodic reporting, which must be required for all sources and all trades.
A key tool to both ensuring accountability and promoting fair environmental outcomes
is to allow public access to the data and information used to support and design trading
programs. This basic level of transparency can help to build support among all citizens and
stakeholders for investing scant public resources in trading markets.
To promote transparency, EPA and Bay states should collect information such as:
■■ data on the number and identity of trading entities subject to trading compliance

audits, out of compliance with both regulatory requirements and trading agreements,
and the success of enforcement efforts;
■■ maps of trading boundaries and areas, sources of pollution, and where credits are

generated and used;
■■ the market value of a credit;
■■ for individual trades: nutrient management plans, soil conservation plans, monitoring

reports, and all trade and credit tracking documentation.
To facilitate tracking, public information should then be electronically stored and easily
available in a single place online, such as the existing Bay Tracking and Accountability
System (BayTAS).19
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To ensure that water quality trading leads to improved water quality, and
to account for uncertainties, EPA and Bay states should design trading
programs with ratios greater than 1:1 to account for the uncertainties in
measuring, monitoring, and applying trading credits and to promote water
quality improvements.
Trading ratios account for a number of challenges that are relevant to achieving water
quality goals by requiring that buyers purchase more credits than they require to achieve
their discharge allocations. Because even the best trading regime is unlikely to result in
the necessary reductions, and because uncertainties will remain about the precise extent of
reductions made, credit sellers should be required to produce more reductions than they sell.
The trading ratio is an important tool for any water quality trading program
because it can compensate for uncertainty in the effectiveness of BMPs in
reducing pollutant runoff as well as differences in hydrology and geography
between trading partners. Because trading ratios make credits more expensive, as
Bay states develop numeric water quality criteria and scientific research provides more
certainty in quantifying and measuring discharge reductions, the uncertainty portion of
ratios may be adjusted downwards.
Restrictions on New Permits in Impaired Waters and Pinto Creek
Within the Chesapeake Bay watershed, 89 of 92 segments are classified as impaired
for nutrients. New permits for discharges into impaired waters are addressed by 40
C.F.R. 122.4, which requires permit applicants to show that (1) existing loading in
the segment leaves room for additional discharges without violating the TMDL and
(2) existing discharges are subject to compliance schedules that will achieve the
water quality standards for that water body.
In the 2007 case Friends of Pinto Creek v. EPA, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled this regulation requires strict adherence to these conditions and that a trading
program cannot circumvent them. The decision neither translates into a complete
prohibition on new permits for new discharges into impaired waters, nor does it
constitute an outright prohibition on trading programs.

Pinto Creek does provide a measure of accountability, though, and leverage for
EPA to put sources on enforceable schedules to meet the Bay TMDL if state trading
programs go forward. For example, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the phrase “all
dischargers” to include both point sources and nonpoint sources. Under the ruling,
both categories must be on track to meet water quality standards before EPA or a
state issues new permits.
EPA has suggested in Section 10 and Appendix S of the Bay TMDL that offsetting
new and expanded discharges is a priority for the agency. EPA and Bay states should
also commit to following Pinto Creek and not issue a permit if a new or expanded
discharge will cause or contribute to a violation of water quality standards in an
impaired water body.
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To achieve the Bay TMDL, water quality trading programs should avoid 1:1
trading ratios, with very few exceptions such as point-source-to-point-source
trades where the certainty of reductions is high and no other monitoring or
geographic issues are present. Poorly designed or overly simplified ratios facilitate
trades at the expense of environmental protection. Ratios will ultimately depend on trading
partners and may have to be established on a case-by-case basis, with general principles
available for predictability.

Principle 2: A rigorous, accountable trading program
protects human health and the environment
by avoiding the creation of hot spots and other
environmental harms and inequities.
Trading that leads to environmental inequities is fundamentally unfair to the people
who live and work or draw drinking water near that segment of the watershed near that
segment of the watershed. In some parts of the Chesapeake, watermen exposed to blooms
of the toxic dinoflagellate Pfiesteria have reported cognitive impairment lasting weeks
or months.20 Cryptosporidium from animal waste and sewage has led to an increased
number of beach closures, limiting the recreational opportunities for communities in the
Bay watershed.21 Disproportionate environmental harms and the lack of water
quality improvements undermine water quality trading programs and erode
efforts to hold polluters accountable.
In the Bay, water quality trading will essentially move pollution from one water segment to
another, concentrating pollution in some places while reducing it in others. Although the
total amount of pollution should decrease, areas of high pollution concentration pose a risk
of harmful localized nutrient loading, or “hot spots” of pollution. Not all pollution is created
equally: “nutrient pollution” largely constitutes sewage, wastewater, and manure—all of
which contain bacteria and pathogens such as fecal coliform, E.coli, and cryptosporidium;
heavy metals and toxins; and antibiotics and other pharmaceutical products, in addition
to the nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment that suffocate the Bay. Excess nutrients in the
Chesapeake also drive algal blooms that support the growth of toxic blue-green algae and
other harmful pathogens.
To avoid hot spots and other environmental inequities, Bay state trading
programs should implement geographic, seasonal, and general restrictions
on trades.
Downstream trading, where a point source purchases credits from a seller downstream,
can create unacceptably high levels of nutrient loading in the segment between the two
sources. EPA should work with Bay states to prohibit downstream trading unless special
approval is granted. Trading cannot threaten progress toward attainment of water quality
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standards, increase nutrient loading downstream of the purchaser, or cause exceedances
in any segment.
EPA should also strictly adhere to section 122.4 of the CWA regulations to restrict trading
that will cause or contribute to water quality violations. This may also require limiting the
geographic or seasonal scope of trades, restricting the total amount of credits one source
may purchase, reducing proposed trades, or even prohibiting certain trades outright. For
example, runoff from agricultural lands is seasonal and may not coincide with seasonal
pollutant extremes in the watershed. EPA and Bay states should also consider placing
limits on certain pollutant forms that exert an acute effect (such as ammonia nitrogen),
modifying NPDES permits to limit the amount of a facility’s discharge that can be
met through credits, or prohibiting trades above a certain amount or based on certain
practices.22 When the risk of localized impacts exists, regulators should also retain the
authority to prohibit or alter trades outright and instead require actual nutrient reductions
at the source when there is a risk of localized impact.
EPA should also retract its tacit support for interstate trading in Section 10 of the Bay
TMDL.23 Proposed interstate and interbasin trading raises concerns about the consistency
of trading requirements across state lines, as well as the effectiveness of trading in
unrelated basins and the potential for disparate impacts. Interstate trades should be
generally prohibited unless reviewed and approved by agencies or a scientific panel. If Bay
states continue to move forward on interstate trading, EPA should require that the most
stringent rules apply when more than one state trading program is invoked in intersegment,
or interbasin trades. EPA should require that the Bay states formally agree to such rules.

Lessons from the Lower Boise River:
Geographic Restrictions in NPDES Permits
In the Lower Boise trading program, regulators issue modified NPDES permits that
restrict the ability of individual point sources to engage in downstream trading. The
Lower Boise program does not prohibit downstream trades but rather restricts the
aggregate amount of downstream trading permitted. Regulators in the Chesapeake
should also take care to ensure that downstream trading be considered in the
aggregate, rather than on a permit-by-permit basis. While limited downstream
trading may be permissible, with so much trading envisioned for the Chesapeake, it
is feasible that too many individual downstream trades could be permitted without
consideration for the aggregate impact.
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EPA and Bay states should terminate trades that result in hot spots, especially
when such hot spots will disproportionately harm minority or low-income
communities.
Health burdens and environmental harms are not shared equally, and low-income
communities may be disproportionately impacted by potential hot spots created by trading.
For example, low-income and minority communities in urban environments such as
Baltimore may be unable to use other parts of the watershed for recreation or sustenance.
In other parts of the watershed, many people draw water from wells that are contaminated
with nitrates and bacteria from fertilizer, manure, and septic tanks. Those hazards hurt the
poorest and most marginalized citizens because they often lack the financial resources or
political influence to seek remedies.
To protect the most vulnerable populations within the watershed, the Bay states should
provide mechanisms for restricting or terminating trades that create hot spots.
EPA and Bay states should consider environmental justice concerns and
other equity impacts when establishing trading programs and approving
individual trades.
The environmental justice movement recognizes that every person should have equal access
to a healthy environment and some minimum level of natural resources to pursue a safe,
purposeful, and dignified existence.24 A commitment to environmental justice in nutrient
trading programs requires that policy makers ensure full and fair participation in all
trading decisions that affect poor and minority communities. Regulators and government
agencies must also guarantee that poor and minority communities do not experience any
disproportionate delay or reduction in receiving any benefits of trading, such as income
from credit-generating activities or aesthetic benefits from green spaces that help retain
stormwater runoff.

Principle 3: A rigorous, accountable trading program
relies on strong oversight and vigorous enforcement
to ensure actual pollution reductions.
If trading goes forward in the capacity envisioned by its supporters, neither EPA’s nor
Bay states’ current regulatory apparatus will be sufficiently robust or solvent to handle
the volume. EPA and Bay states will need to seek considerable additional resources to
appropriately manage trading in a way that is fair, trustworthy, and effective. EPA and
Bay states must also ensure that trading programs and their participants remain legally
accountable for their trades, including for failed reductions and fraudulent trades, if
genuine reductions are to be made.
EPA should exercise its oversight authority under the CWA to ensure that
trading programs help Bay states achieve water quality standards and
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the Bay TMDL and should require states to develop contingency plans that
specifically address shortcomings in the proposed trading programs and
outcomes.
Consistent and substantial federal regulatory oversight is key for trading programs to
succeed. Indeed, the CWA entrusts EPA with the ultimate responsibility to administer
and oversee the health and vitality of the nation’s waters, and EPA must fully exercise
that responsibility. Although EPA has published some guidance on water quality trading,
the guidance is extremely weak, filled with vague, non-binding suggestions, and explicitly
articulates the agency’s detached approach to trading.25 EPA should expand and improve
upon existing guidance as well as emphasize the importance of the requirements established
in Appendix S of the Bay TMDL.
As a federal agency, EPA is uniquely poised and explicitly tasked to protect
public health and the environment by holding Bay states accountable for
achieving their pollution reductions. The agency cannot do this by merely consulting
with Bay states. EPA must strictly and deliberately oversee Bay states’ trading programs.
EPA and Bay states should ensure that trades are enforceable by either
incorporating trade terms into the NPDES permit of a point source or
memorializing the trade terms in a contract that allows EPA or the state to
enforce the contract.
To ensure that trading regimes are legally accountable, a mechanism must be in place to
allow regulators to enforce the terms of nutrient trades. To that end, EPA should mandate
that state permit writers incorporate trade transactions into NPDES permits held by the
point source seeking to buy or sell credits. If no regulated entity with a permit is involved
in the trade, EPA should require that trades be memorialized in a contractual instrument
that is enforceable by a state agency or EPA. This could be accomplished by naming EPA
or the state agency as a third party beneficiary, for example.
EPA and Bay states must take credible, consistent, and meaningful
enforcement actions to deter future violations.
EPA and Bay states must remain willing to consistently and effectively impose penalties on
sources whose discharges exceed their permits limits or credit allocations. In the trading
context, demand for credits is only as strong as the threat of enforcement to comply with
pollution reduction targets. If the regulated community does not believe it will face real
punishment for violations of trading agreements or permit requirements, demand for
credits will falter and water quality will not improve.
If the regulated community views enforcement as both unlikely and, when implemented,
weak, it has little incentive to comply with the CWA. The same goes for trading. If
noncompliance becomes the status quo, demand will plummet as regulated entities opt
to delay upgrades and ignore their pollution reduction obligations rather than pay for
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credits. Recent statistics on nationwide CWA enforcement are dispiriting: between 2004
and 2007, the New York Times found that CWA violations nationwide grew 16 percent.
During the same period, enforcement was alarmingly low: fewer than 3 percent of CWA
violations resulted in fines or other significant punishments.26 These statistics support the
link between lax enforcement and a willingness on the part of companies to ignore the law.

Citizen Suit Enforcement
Citizen suit enforcement is another type of enforcement and oversight that can
supplement EPA and state efforts to catch violations that harm public health and the
environment. Citizen suit enforcement will be difficult to pursue for water quality
trading because it is not explicitly authorized in the CWA, nor do Bay states include
citizen suit enforcement in their trading programs. As discussed above, Bay states
and EPA should work together to extend citizen suit provisions to trading.

Conclusion
EPA and Bay states should commit to evaluating not how but whether trading will work
for the Chesapeake. Too often, evaluations of water quality trading have been based
on the assumption that trading activity will happen. The many obstacles to successful
trading programs mean that regulators and politicians should be honest and realistic
about the goals and potential outcomes. Bay states and EPA must focus on environmental
improvement, and recognize, explicitly, that trading is but one tool among many. Several
recent evaluations of water quality trading have made clear that trading alone may not
be sufficient. And if trading does not work, the Chesapeake cannot be left to wallow. For
example, the trading program in the Cherry Creek Basin in Colorado experienced only
90 pounds of traded phosphorous over more than ten years, and water quality remains
impaired.27
As proposed, many of the Bay states’ programs are missing the rigor required of a
successful trading program. Some Bay states, like Pennsylvania, are allowing trading to
move forward too quickly without sufficient consideration for successful design or real
accountability. EPA and citizens concerned about the health of the Bay should critically
monitor Bay states as these programs develop. Without the components outlined here to
protect water quality and human health, trading should be merely one tool for achieving
the Bay TMDL and should not overshadow efforts to control pollutant discharge through
more stringent NPDES permits or regulation of the major sectors that pollute the Bay. EPA
and the Bay states should also commit to re-evaluating the trading programs every year and
be prepared to implement other tools immediately if trading activity fails to materialize.
Ultimately, trading must prove its worth by producing real pollutant reductions that lead
to measurable and verifiable improvements in the Chesapeake Bay.
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